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Child's Place in Nature: Talking Animals in Victorian Children's Fiction 
 
 Stories in which animals talk are a very ancient genre, or group of genres, 
dating back to Aesop or beyond. They can be used to teach a moral, to satirize 
humanity, to allegorise spiritual or political messages, to invert hierarchies in a 
carnivalesque mode.1 These stories were not, initially, directed especially at children, 
and still need not be so: a twentieth-century example would be Orwell's Animal Farm, 
a book which caused me great distress when I read it as a child, thinking it was a 
children's book. (Though this anecdote contains all sorts of assumptions about what 
children should read, what children are, and how they are different from adults.) 
Margaret Blount maintains that children often do not like animal stories, but adults 
like giving them to children, because 'they are supposed to be "improving" in some 
way, pointing oblique and therefore palatable morals, or helping one's nature study 
along'.2 Another explanation would be that, like fairy tales, this is an adult genre that 
has drifted down to children's literature, as the boundaries of what is childish and what 
is adult have been redefined. 
 A separate children's literature is a relatively recent development, beginning in 
the Eighteenth Century. Claims that childhood itself is a modern invention, unknown 
in classical or medieval times, have recently been much disputed by historians, but a 
particular Romantic construction of childhood was being formed in the late Eighteenth 
and early Nineteenth Centuries.3 If the child is seen as nearer to Nature than the adult, 
nature stories must be specially suitable for childish readers; if the child is more 
imaginative than the adult, the fantasy element (we all know animals don't talk) is also 
more suitable to children. Notice that these definitions of the child carry along with 
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them (or even proceed from) complementary implied definitions of the adult, in the 
same way that femininity is defined by taken-for-granted assumptions about 
masculinity. So the adult becomes a person who is divorced from Nature, rational, 
logical, scientific. This is also an adult who knows what the differences are between 
animals and humans, how our species is defined. The child, by contrast, has still to 
learn these markers and rules, and exists in a space of play in which boundaries could 
potentially be transgressed. There is also the seemingly transhistorical fact that 
children are born unable to speak, and in this respect are like animals - though in a 
culture which believed animals could speak, this would not be a similarity, and tales 
about talking animals would not be seen as 'fantasy'. Here I am suggesting also that 
what exactly we think about animals, how we define them, contains other important 
sets of assumptions that serve to construct the animal/human divide. 
 I am beginning here to touch on some issues that were of course central and 
worrying to many Victorians. The title of my paper, 'Child's Place in Nature', is an 
adaptation, or parody, of T.H. Huxley's Man's Place in Nature, published in 1863, in 
which he argues for the evolutionary kinship of men and 'the man-like apes'.4 Huxley's 
book was part of a wider controversy on the nature of the human in relation to the 
animal, brought on by the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species. The purpose of 
my paper is to trace how, in the Nineteenth Century, scientific debate about the 
human and the animal intersects with, or leaves its mark on, the venerable genre of the 
animal story, in its contemporary child-directed form. What kind of child is being 
constructed in these works to hear what kind of message about Nature? More 
specifically, how is the issue of animal speech handled, at a time when the possession 
of language became a vital sign of the difference between men and animals - either a 
difference to be insisted upon, or one to be explained away? In dealing with these 
issues, what does children's literature make possible that is not allowed in writing 
directed at adults? 
 For the purposes of this paper, I am going to concentrate on Mrs. Gatty's 
Parables from Nature (1855-71) and Kipling's Jungle Books (1894-5), with some 
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reference to Kingsley's The Water Babies (1863).5 I am not interested, at the moment, 
in those writers who, like Lewis Carroll or Hilaire Belloc, obviously parody the animal 
story genre in children's literature. I want instead to look at writers who convey some 
kind of scientific or rationalist allegiance - who, as well as using their talking animals to 
teach morality and to delight by their obvious fictionality, also claim to be conveying 
facts and truths about Nature, 'helping our nature study along', as Blount puts it. In 
his story 'Tiger, Tiger', from the first Jungle Book, Kipling draws attention to the 
newness, the modernity, of his animal stories as opposed to the old, superstitious 
kind. Mowgli, brought up in the Jungle by wolves,  has returned to the human village, 
and he listens to old Buldeo, the village hunter, telling 'wonderful' stories 'of the ways 
of beasts in the Jungle'. Mowgli, who 'knew something about what they were talking 
of, had to cover his face not to show that he was laughing'. Buldeo explains that the 
tiger known by Mowgli as Shere Khan 'was inhabited by the ghost of a wicked old 
money-lender', who limped, and this is why the tiger limps. Mowgli intervenes to 
pour scorn on this superstition: 'Are all these tales such cobwebs and moontalk? . . . 
That tiger limps because he was born lame, as everyone knows. To talk of the soul of 
a money-lender in a beast that never had the courage of a jackal is child's talk' (I:76-7).  
 The use of 'child' as a term of abuse here is interesting, associating it with 
fantasy and mythmaking. In contrast, Kipling is implicitly claiming that his stories 
about Mowgli and the Jungle are 'grown-up', demystified, accurate. And yet of course 
they are not - grown-ups know animals can't talk, as they do to Mowgli. It is only in a 
child's perception that this can happen - in stories addressed to children, from the 
point of view of the child Mowgli. In the only Mowgli story addressed to adults, 'In 
the Rukh', the animals don't talk; and those of Kipling's other adult tales which include 
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talking animals are much more obviously only jokey political allegories.6 In the Jungle 
Books, Kipling negotiates this tension between the childish and the non-childish with 
considerable skill. This tension is central to much children's literature: on the one hand, 
children are being instructed in adult truth, to help them grow up; on the other, the 
child's special, separate world is being celebrated.7 
 Mrs Gatty also shows the need to refer to an adult, scientific truth which 
opposes her fictionalising, mythologising tendencies. In a parable about 'Night and 
Day', she playfully allows that 'now the wise men will not allow that Night and Day 
drive round the world in cars with horses to them. Well, perhaps they don't. Perhaps 
it is really true that the earth is a dark ball, hanging in the open space which we call the 
firmament of heaven, moving slowly round the shining sun, but spinning like a top all 
the time itself, so that first one side and then the other faces the brightness; and thus 
there is a constant change from lightness to darkness and darkness to light going on all 
over the world' (246). The length and carefulness with which this theory is described 
works against the dismissiveness of 'perhaps'. Nevertheless, Mrs Gatty asserts, Night 
and Day still praise the Lord, and we may hear their voices in a new scientific and 
technological context: 'as musical sounds . . . sweep along the wires of the electric 
telegraph on breezy days' (247). An important point that emerges about Mrs Gatty 
here is that she, like Kingsley, and like many early Victorian scientists, is pursuing 
science in a religious context, and sees this as no contradiction. Both of them give the 
highest authority in their children's books to the naturalist with the microscope. He 
represents a true science of observation and religious wonder; but both writers also 
create figures who represent an illegitimate, atheistic, materialistic, false science given 
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to unproven speculation and categorical assertion. Both Mrs Gatty and Kingsley were 
talented naturalists themselves - in the Victorian context, the implication of calling 
them 'amateur' scientists would be misleading. Darwin too was a gentleman 'amateur', 
as opposed to the new aggressive professionals, Tyndall and Huxley. 
 As children's writers then, both Mrs Gatty and Kingsley present 'facts' of 
natural history, combined with messages of Christian faith and morality, and 'childish' 
fantasy. This mixture is negotiated by Kingsley through an exuberant, carnivalesque 
mode. His allusions to the 'truth' or otherwise of his fictions are tied up in a 
complicated double-bluff: 'Am I in earnest? Oh, dear no! Don't you know that this is a 
fairy-tale, and all fun and pretence; and that you are not to believe one word of it, even 
if it is true?' (57).  Mrs Gatty's parables, on the other hand, are more single minded, 
but often seem to be getting out of control, as the morals she tries to attach to her 
material don't quite fit. 
 Before embarking on a more detailed analysis of my children's writers, I want 
to look briefly at the construction of the child by Victorian science, in relation to 
language and to animals. In 1877, the journal Mind contained a translation of an article, 
first published in 1876, by Hypolite Taine, on 'The Acquisition of Language by 
Children'. In the next number, there followed an article by Darwin, 'Biographical 
Sketch of an Infant', corroborating much of what Taine had said, though, typically of 
Darwin, without formulating as many conclusions.8 Taine both compares the child's 
language to animal noises, and differentiates it from them: 'she takes delight in twitter 
like a bird', but 'if I compare her to animals . . . I find that . . . she far surpasses them in 
the delicacy and adundance of her expressive intonations.' Nevertheless, the child's 
speech is given a natural origin - for instance,  her word 'Ham' for 'eat' is described as 
'the natural vocal gesture of a person snapping up anything'(252, 257). Darwin's 
article rather differently also suggests a natural origin for language - the musical 
intonations of the child support the theory he elaborates in The Expression of the 
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Emotions in Man and Animals (1874), 'that before man uttered articulate language, he 
uttered notes in a true musical scale as does the anthropoid ape Hylobates' (293).  
 As well as comparing the child to animals, both Darwin and Taine compare her 
(or him, in Darwin's case) to primitive peoples. For Taine, 'the mental state of a child' 
is in many respects 'that of primitive peoples at the poetical and mythological stage' 
(258). For Darwin, less positively, the child's fears may be 'the inherited effect of real 
dangers and abject superstitions during ancient savage times' (288). This connection is 
put in a larger framework by Taine, using one of the staples of Victorian evolutionary 
thinking - recapitulation theory: 'the child presents in a passing state the natural 
characteristics that are found in a fixed state in primitive civilisations, very much as 
the human embryo presents in a passing state the physical characteristics that are 
found in a fixed state in the classes of inferior animals' (259). Ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny here - that is, the development of each individual parallels and is causally 
connected to, the development of the race as a whole.9 There are many unexamined 
assumptions in recapitulation theory, and we can see some illogicalities in Taine's 
application of it: if 'the child' recapitulates in a 'passing state' the 'fixed state' of adults  
in so-called 'primitive civilisations', where does that put the 'primitive' child? 
 We can see in Taine's article the Romantic child being reconstituted as the 
evolutionary child, more primitive and more poetic, literally closer to animals, than 
adults. While the child appears then almost as a 'missing link' between animal and 
human, primitive and civilised, at the same time a hierarchy is assumed, 
inferior/superior animals, primitive/civilised man. Interestingly, in a passing analogy, 
Taine also gives this hierarchy a class dimension: man's language and ideas are 
distinguished from animals' by their 'delicacy', 'he is among them what a great and fine 
poet, Heine or Shakespeare, would be among workmen and peasants' (253). Mrs 
Gatty, Kingsley and Kipling all at some point read class meanings into, or out of, 
animal/human or animal/animal hierarchies. For instance, Mrs Gatty draws this moral 
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from her story 'Kicking', which is about a rebellious colt who has to be tamed: 
'Animals under man - servants under masters - children under parents - wives under 
husbands - nations under rulers - all under God' (268). Here gender, 'wives under 
husbands', is added to the list of hierarchies. Mrs Gatty is, however, no evolutionist - 
evolution adds a time-dimension to this already given hierarchy. What the addition of 
this dimension blurs is the question of who can change into what in the hierarchy: 
children, obviously, change into adults; in the colonialist project, primitive peoples 
can be changed into civilised peoples, or they can be eliminated as relics belonging to 
an earlier time; but what about animals? Some have changed into men: are the rest 
bound for extinction, or do they remain as living fossils? Even more problematic, what 
about the lower classes? Do they evolve?  
 Kingsley, in The Water Babies suggests this is so, by turning Tom the working 
class chimney sweep into a water-baby with gills, who has to live through a time with 
the 'lower' animals till he can emerge as a morally responsible, middle-class adult 
human. As the Queen of the fairies says, 'He is but a savage now, and like the beasts 
which perish: and from the beasts which perish he must learn' (42).10 Tom, the fish-
like water baby, is like one of the early stages of the human embryo, embryology, via 
recapitulation theory, providing one of the key arguments for evolution. Mrs Gatty, 
as opposed to Kingsley, does not use an evolutionary model, and being content with 
one's station in life is the moral of many of her stories. Class analogies do, however, 
create confusion in her stories. She is very fond of the analogy of metamorphosis - the 
caterpillar changing into the butterfly. She uses it not as an analogy of evolution, but, 
as was standard among Victorian writers and painters, as an analogy of the soul's 
immortality, our translation after death into a higher and different spiritual world. But 
in her story 'A Lesson of Faith ', the caterpillar is given a humble, worthy working-
class character, while the butterfly is frivolous, stupid and upper-class (1-6). Why the 
caterpillar should be so pleased to find out it will become a butterfly is thus unclear, 
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as is the politics of the implied change in class terms. The parable has escaped from its 
moral. 
 What I'm arguing is that all the parts of this multiple hierarchy don't always 
work smoothly together. While all the writers I am concerned with are keen to assert 
hierarchy, all to some extent also undermine it, suggesting in particular that animals 
may be better than humans, and children than adults. There are also  tensions in 
Taine's formulations of the idea. In comparing man to a highly civilised, educated, 
refined, grown-up 'poet', Taine contradicts his later assertion that the child is nearer to 
the 'poetical and mythological stage' of primitive peoples. There is a profound 
ambivalence as to how the 'lower' stages of the hierarchy are to be valued. This 'poetic' 
propensity in the child is applied by Taine specifically to the phenomenon of talking 
animal stories, in a passage which I want to quote at length, as it has many interesting 
analogies with the children's literature I am focusing on: 
 If we speak to her of an object . . . her first question always is - 'What does it 
say?' - 'What does the rabbit say? - 'What does the bird say?' - 'What does the 
horse say?' - 'What does the big tree say?' Animal or tree, she immediately meets it 
as a person and wants to know its thoughts and words; that is what she cares 
about; by a spontaneous induction she imagines it like herself, like us; she 
humanises it. This disposition is found among primitive peoples, the more strong 
the more primitive they are; in the Edda, especially in the Mabinogion, animals 
have also the gift of speech. (258) 
 We have already seen the propensity of 'primitive' people to tell 'childish' 
stories about animals disparaged by Kipling - his attitude to primitive people in this 
story seems more like Darwin's to the 'abject superstitions' of savages.  The passage 
from Taine implies that perhaps the child can reclaim as fiction what the adult has to 
lose as primitive superstition, but Mrs Gatty, Kingsley and Kipling all accompany 
such a move with careful re-writings, re-formulations and framings of the old 
'primitive' traditions. This is most evident in Mrs Gatty's story, 'Inferior Animals', 
which uncannily echoes Taine's words, though it was published before his article. In 
Taine, the child asks '"What does it say?" - "What does the rabbit say?" - "What does 
the bird say?"' etc. Mrs Gatty's story opens like this: 'What do they say? - What do 
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they say? - Whay do they say? - What can they have to say, those noisy, cawing 
rooks?' (193)  As in Taine, the innate assumption that animals talk is attributed to 
children: 'See the little child as she babbles to her cat on the rug, and would fain be 
friends' (194). This story is the only one of her parables in which Mrs Gatty 
ruminates about actual animal speech, and the differences of human and animal in 
regard to language. In other parables, she cheerfully attributes speech not just to 
animals, but to trees, flowers and inanimate objects, making it clear by this 
undiscriminating attitude that the speech is only an arbitrary imaginative device. 
'Inferior Animals' is also the only story in which she tackles evolutionary thought, by 
means of a comic parody: the rooks turn out to be arguing, from available evidence, 
that man is really a degenerate form of rook. It is as if evolutionary thought raises too 
uncomfortably the idea of animal/human kinship, and causes her to examine what she 
is doing in using the talking animal convention.   
 Mrs Gatty, as I have said, was no Darwinian, and subscribes rather to Paleyan 
Natural Theology, a set of ideas highly influential on Victorian science.11 Natural 
theologians argue that the natural world contains evidence of the existence and 
goodness of God, and this is the justification for nature study. But, perhaps because 
she is writing for children, Mrs Gatty feels no need to argue this position closely or 
consistently. I have already pointed to the arbitrary nature of her proceedings, and in 
the parable 'Motes in the Sunbeam' two different religious interpretations are given, by 
a character in the story, to the same phenomenon (133-7). This story seems to admit 
that morals drawn from nature are just analogies, not evidence, as does her title, 
Parables ; but, in other stories, some interpretations, made by human or animal 
characters, are clearly labelled as wrong, both from a religious and a scientific point of 
view.12 
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 'Inferior Animals' similarly mixes serious discussion of animal language and 
what it might mean, with the playful use of that language as a device to mock 
evolutionary thought.  'That they do understand each other's song is clear', says the 
narrator, judiciously.  The problem of knowing what they say is mutual 
unintelligibility: 'we are altogether as ignorant' of their language 'as they would be of 
ours round a large dinner table'. This idea is then used to mock human pretensions: 'As 
to the noises, there is not much to choose between them in the manner of 
agreeableness. Nay, of the two, perhaps the din produced by human voices is the 
more discordant and confused' (193). The narrator proceeds to lament the 'necessary 
unlearning' of our childhood instinct for intercommunication with the animals (194). 
She quotes from Novalis: 'Only children, or child-like men . . . have any chance of 
breaking through the charm which holds nature thus as it were frozen around us, like a 
petrified magic city' (196). She then appeals to the (grown-up) reader to join her in 
becoming a child, and approach the rooks:  
 Come! own with me how hateful were the lessons which undeceived us from 
our earlier instincts of faith and sweet companionship with all created things: and 
let us go forth together, and for a while forget such teaching. Hand in hand, in the 
dear confiding way in which only children use, let us go forth into the fields, and 
read the hidden secrets of the world. (196) 
 This passage could stand as an apologia for all her parables: the childlike frame 
of mind allows a temporary regression to the primitive and poetic anthropomorphic 
vision of Nature. Valuing the childish allows the narrator to attack 'the great 
philosophers', who cannot explain or translate the rooks' behaviour, and so prove 
themselves inadequate as guides to the Creator's larger purposes and proceedings 
(197). Preferable is the childlike vision, which works like magic, but also to dispel 
magic: 'the spell is broken at last, and language, language, resounds on every side!' 
(198) Then follows a separate section, entitled 'What the Rook Says'. What the rooks 
turn out to be saying, however, is a very funny parody of evolutionary argument, 
enjoyable for children, but with an extra meaning for adults. Man's characteristics, as 
observed by the rooks, are interpreted as a degeneration from his original rook-like 
form - his arms are vestigial wings, his clothes the remains of feathers. Man, they 
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argue, is attempting to become a rook again, as evidenced, for instance by his 
predilection for black:  
 'Black also the usual colour of the coverings with which men protect their 
heads from the outer air. Black even the clumsy boots which cover their feet. 
Black pretty nearly everything, everywhere, Mr Ravenwing positively declared. 
 'And on another occasion, in some parts of the country, he came upon whole 
races of men who left their homes every morning at an early hour, white, but 
returned to them every evening black, having accomplished this transformation 
during the course of the day.' (208) 
The rook-evolutionist is talking about coal-mines here, as soon becomes clear.  
 All through the rooks' debate, the narrator as observer interjects. She seems to 
have forgotten her child-like transformation, and makes authoritative comments 
designed to put the rooks in their place and point the moral: '- But I - the transcriber 
of this arrant nonsense - am ready, as I listen to their senseless caws, to throw down 
my tablets in despair. Oh! to think of finding the false glozings of philosophical 
conceit among the birds of the air' (199); or, later, ' Am I then half-convinced? - Yet for 
an imperfect being to hope to fathom the higher nature? Bah! what balderdash of 
folly!' (207). This is a recurring moral in many of Mrs Gatty's parables: that the 
'lower' (animals, children, or man in relation to God) do not possess the faculties to 
understand the 'higher' nature, and must submit to the authority of those wiser and 
better endowed. While the rooks are being mocked as 'inferior', because they label man 
as 'inferior', at the same time they are acting as a parody of human scientific behaviour 
and pretentions; so, in a further twist, the story is also about human 'inferiority'. Some 
words the narrator used in the opening frame of the story, mocking human language, 
are now spoken by the rooks: 'There is, in fact, "neither sweetness nor sublimity, 
neither melody nor majesty, in the shouting, and piping, and whistling, and hissing, 
and barking of closely intermixed human voices and laughter"'. Hearing them, the 
narrator becomes quite giddy: ' - Where am I? - where am I? - what am I about? Is 
some mocking echo repeating my former words?' (211) Her pretention of adult, and 
human, authority is undercut. She finally extricates herself from the situation by 
turning it all into a drem. The sympathetic, childlike reader has disappeared, and the 
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whole vision was inspired by a certain 'book' that was lying on her desk, perhaps by 
Darwin, though the arguments used by the rooks are more Lamarkian, depending on 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics. But, as Ellegard has pointed out, very few 
of Darwin's readers grasped the subtleties and implications of his argument about 
Natural Selection.13  
 The convolutions of this story are quite daunting. What seems to be happening 
is that on the one hand a hierarchy of inferior and superior animals, rooks and men,  is 
being asserted, but on the other, man is being debased from his 'superior' status, and a 
rook's eye view of him is given a degree of truth. At the same time, the child's eye 
view, which delights in an improbable fable, is given priority over the prideful grown-
up evolutionists who do not know all the answers, though the adult voice of the 
narrator is needed to point the moral for us.  The carnivalesque propensities of talking 
animal stories are emerging: the narrator seems all too aware of the need to frame and 
restrict carnival to a special period of licence, belonging here to the child and to the 
dream.14 
 This need to clamp down again, and re-assert hierarchy, suggests that none of 
these stories are giving animals a 'voice' in  present-day animal liberationist terms.15 
They are also of a different genre than for instance Anna Sewell's Black Beauty 
(1896), which aims to promote kindness to animals by telling a life-story in the voice 
and from the perspective of  an animal. This sort of story was particulary associated 
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with women's mission to educate and humanise children.16 Mrs Gatty's analogous 
story, 'Kicking', seems at first to put us in the horse's place: everyone 'ought to sit 
from time to time in his neighbour's chair, and look with his neighbour's eyes, from his 
neighbour's position, at what he himself is about'. This will make us 'wiser, as well as 
kinder'. In this story, we are to sit 'in neighbour Firefly the spirited young chestnut 
colt's chair' - a rather grotesque metaphor, which functions to remind us of the 
animal/human divide even while recommending we cross it (249). And the moral of the 
story is once more submission, with no hint of criticism for any of the methods used 
to 'break' the colt. The only criticism is of an old mare whose grumbling wrongly 
provokes Firefly into resistance against men. The right advice is given by a wise old 
Welsh pony - advice directly applicable to children as well, in Mrs Gatty's scheme of 
analogies: 'they were not brought here to be teazed to death . . . but to prepare them 
for being taught a thousand nice things which they would never be able to do if they 
were not taught, and which it would be immensely jolly to do, when the teaching was 
once over' (257).  Kingsley and Kipling also do not use animal voices to argue for the 
better treatment of animals. Kingsley includes a lesson of kindness, but is is given by 
the allegorical Mrs Bedonebyasyoudid, not through the voices of animals. In Kipling, 
the Jungle Book story 'The White Seal' focuses on the cruelty of the seal hunters, but 
there is no appeal to humans to behave differently. Instead, the seal hero leads his 
people to safety in a land without men (99-127). In the Mowgli stories, the stupid 
villagers are cruel to Mowgli and to each other, not to animals.  
 Both Kingsley and Kipling also exhibit the self-consciousness about animal 
language that Mrs Gatty shows in 'Inferior Animals'. In The Water Babies, Kingsley 
asserts that language is a paramount human distinguishing characteristic. He mocks the 
controversy between Huxley and Owen over the similarity or not of human and ape 
brains: 'You may think that there are other more important differences between you 
and an ape, such as being able to speak, and make machines, and know right from 
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wrong, and say your prayers' (111-12). But earlier he has told his child reader, 'Now 
you must know that all things under the water talk; only not such a language as ours; 
but such as horses, and dogs, and cows, and birds talk to each other, and Tom soon 
learnt to understand them and talk to them' (66). This animal language is allowable 
because it is of a different kind, and because it is understood by a special person, a 
half-animal, a fish-like boy.  
 Both these characteristics also apply to the animals' language in Kipling's 
'Mowgli' stories. It is again only a special, half-animal boy, Mowgli, who can 
understand them, though he does not have the fantastic, playful status of Tom the 
water-baby, but is grounded in real stories of boys brought up by wolves. The animals 
speak in a special, heightened, archaic form of English, in line with their more 
primitive and poetic staus: '"Out!" snapped Father Wolf. "Out and hunt with thy 
master. Thou hast done harm enough for one night." "I go," said Tabaqui quietly. "Ye 
can hear Shere Khan below in the thickets. I might have saved myself the message"'  (I: 
3-5) Every now and then the narrator, or 'editor' as he calls himself in the Preface, puts 
in brackets a translation of what they are saying, either translating individual terms 
like 'the Gidur Log [the Jackal People]' (I: 2), or whole phrases: 'the stinging fly that 
comes out of white smoke [Hathi meant the rifle]' (II: 26). Here, the animals invent 
metaphors for objects made or controlled by man. Fire is called 'the Red Flower'. The 
editor appears openly as translator in a headnote to one of the interspersed poems: 
'Just to give you an idea of the immense variety of the Jungle Law, I have translated 
into verse (Baloo always recited them in a kind of sing-song) a few of the laws that 
apply to the wolves' (II: 29). How, then, does the editor know this language? The 
very tongue-in-cheek Preface claims that the stories come from many animal 
informants. Many of Kipling's stories depend on a narrator who is in the know of 
some secret or esoteric society, culture or organisation. Satya P. Mohanty has likened 
this to an imperialist desire to know and dominate the natives. 17 
                                                           
17 'Drawing the Color Line: Kipling and the Culture of Colonial Rule', in The Bounds 
of Race: Perspectives on Hegemony and Resistance, ed. Dominick LaCapra, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991. 
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 In this connection it is significant that there is an ambiguity in the Mowgli 
stories as to whether knowing animal language means an admission to kinship, or a 
means to mastery. Mowgli is taught the 'Master Words' of the Jungle, in the speech of 
different species - the bird-people, the snake-people - so that he will be able to say 
'We be of one blood, you and I' in any language. Human and animal are related, but 
knowing the words is also a kind of trick, by which Mowgli compels the animals to do 
his will. The stories chart not only Mowgli's painful division between his animal and 
his human natures - 'I am two Mowglis' he sings - and his inability to be accepted into 
either community, Jungle or village, but also his gradual rise to dominance in the 
Jungle, so that he ends up acknowledged 'Master of the Jungle', recognised as such by 
both Hathi the elephant and Kaa the python, previously the wisest and most 
powerful. All this is part of his growing up and leaving the childhood space of play 
and ambivalence between human and animal natures.18 On either side of this 
transition to adulthood are the last of the children's Mowgli stories, 'The Spring 
Running', and the only 'grown-up' Mowgli story, 'In the Rukh', which do not quite fit 
together. 
 In 'The Spring Running', the animals' language has changed, because of the 
Spring, 'the Time of New Talk', and they no longer pay Mowgli any attention, as 
'they were busy hunting and fighting and killing and singing' (II: 291). The unspoken 
subtext is that this is all to do with mating, and that it is sex, too, that drives Mowgli 
back to humankind. As Darwin says, 'The sexes of many animals incessantly call for 
each other during the breeding-season; and in not a few cases the male endeavours thus 
to excite the female'.19 This 'new talk' excludes Mowgli, and threatens to upset the 
ordered hierarchy of the Jungle and its language. Mowgli rebukes Bagheera, the 
panther, for his childish behaviour, '"is it well for the Black Panther so to mouth and 
                                                           
18 John McBratney sees this safe space also as a place where the boundaries of racial 
and colonial identities can be crossed. See 'Imperial Subjects, Imperial Space', Victorian 
Studies 35: 3 (Spring 1992): 277-93. 
19 The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, London: John Murray, 
1904, p. 85. 
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cough, and howl and roll? Remember, we be the Masters of the Jungle, thou and I."' 
Bagheera answers,  
 'Indeed, yes; I hear, Man-cub . . . We be surely the Masters of the Jungle! Who 
is so strong as Mowgli? Who so wise?' There was a curious drawl in the voice that 
made Mowgli turn to see whether by any chance the Black Panther were making 
fun of him, for the Jungle is full of words that sound like one thing, but mean 
another. 'I said we be beyond question Masters of the Jungle,' Bagheera repeated. 
'Have I done wrong? I did not know that the Man-cub no longer lay upon the 
ground. Does he fly, then?' (265-6) 
Bagheera's irony, and the notion, first introduced here in the last Mowgli story, that 
the Jungle language could have double meanings, undercut Mowgli's pretentions to be 
Master. Similarly, In Mrs Gatty's 'Inferior Animals', the rooks' language has double-
meanings, that both demonstrate man's 'mastery' and the birds' 'inferiority', and 
overturn man's dominance by mocking his pretentions. Once animals have been 
allowed language of any complexity, irony can creep in, and upset fixed animal/human 
hierarchies. The child, who is identified with the animals and their speech, participates 
in these inversions. 'Child', as we have seen, is a pivotal term in the relationship of 
man and animals: the link to the 'primitive' and 'poetic' world of talking animals, and 
the 'primitive' who must be civlised in order to become an adult.  I am suggesting 
that 'The Spring Running' and 'In the Rukh', as 'growing-up' stories, enact these 
ambiguities. In 'The Spring Running', the sexuality that unbalances Mowgli's relation 
of dominance to the animals, and sends him out to humankind, is paradoxically seen as 
'childish' behaviour on the animals' part, their very 'animality'. Sexuality is Mowgli's 
unruly animal nature that he cannot fully master. In the grown-up story, 'In the Rukh', 
however, sex and then marriage act to integrate Mowgli safely into human 
organisations, as he takes a job, with a pension, as a ranger under Gisbourne Sahib of 
the Department of Woods and Forests. This story was in fact written before the other 
Mowgli stories, and is referred to at the end of 'Tiger! Tiger!', the third Mowgli story 
in the first Jungle Book, which ends when Mowgli has been cast out by both Man 
Pack and Wolf Pack: 'So Mowgli went away and hunted with the four wolf cubs in the 
Jungle from that day on. But he was not always alone, because years afterwards he 
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became a man and married. But that is a story for grown-ups' (I: 95). The most 
notable difference from the stories for children is that the animals do not talk. Mowgli 
speaking animal language is observed from outside, from an adult human point of 
view: 'He put out his hand to sign for silence, and still lying on his back called aloud 
thrice - with a deep gurgling cry that was new to Gisbourne'.20 The 
narrator/translator, who could speak to animals because he was speaking to children, 
has disappeared.  
 Mowgli' s equality with the animals is also not evident: his four wolf-brothers 
appear here more like performing dogs. Mowgli is seen 'playing upon a rude bamboo 
flute, to whose music four huge wolves danced solemnly on their hind legs'.21 In 
'Tiger! Tiger!', a Jungle Book story, when the native hunter is mocked for his false 
tales about Mowgli, 'Buldeo embroidered the story of his adventures in the Jungle, till 
he ended by saying that Akela stood up on his hind legs and talked like a man' (I: 93). 
Paradoxically, of course, the animals do talk like man, though it is always emphasised 
that it is a different kind of language. In the Second Jungle Book, as the animals 
encircle Buldeo, they talk unconcernedly, 'for their speech began below the lowest end 
of the scale that untrained human beings can hear' (II: 68). The sort of 'gurgle' that 
Gisbourne hears is not evident: animal language is a silent secret; and of course there is 
no question in the Jungle Books of the animals 'standing on their hind legs'. The 
animals are diminished in this grown-up story, and while Mowgli is seen as a 'wood 
god', a 'Faunus', he is also reduced to a government employee. He is 'placed' in history 
and literature: '"he is an anachronism, for he is before der Iron Age, and der Stone Age. 
Look here, he is at der beginnings of der history of man"', says Muller, the head of the 
Department of Woods and Forests. '"He's like the illustrations in the Classical 
Dictionary"', thinks Gisbourne. Mowgli appears  'in the very form and likeness of that 
Greek god who is so lavishly described in the novels'.22  This very literary classicism 
is quite different from Buldeo's superstitious beliefs, or at least trying to appear so. 
                                                           
20 'In the Rukh', p. 205 
21 ibid. p. 218. 
22 ibid. pp. 216, 198, 215.  
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 Much Victorian debate on 'Man's' place in nature centred on the notion of the 
'missing link'. For the most part, representations of or allusions to this figure in adult 
literature are monstrous and terrifying: the hairy animalistic Mr Hyde (1886); the 
tormented half animal, half human creatures in Wells's Island of Dr Moreau; the 
atavistic Caliban in Browning's 'Caliban upon Setebos' (1864). All these figures 
provide comment on existing human nature, and its repulsive 'animal' component. In 
the domain of children's literature, however, such hybrids can appear charming and 
enjoyable: the wolf-boy Mowgli, the water-baby Tom, and the talking animals 
themselves. Somehow, the grown-up Mowgli of 'In the Rukh' also retains his charm - 
partly with the help from the Classical Dictionary, partly by his unambiguous human 
dominance over the animals: he isn't half animal. The child Mowgli, however, often 
seems so, and is not monstrous.  
 The 'missing link' also appears in another way in the Jungle Books, in the 
characters of the monkeys, the Bandar-log, and their relation to language. Unlike the 
other animals, they have no language of their own, and no law or leader. On one level, 
their community is a satire on America: 'What the Bandar-log think now the Jungle 
will think later', they claim (I: 39). They are also used to mock the superstitious 
Indian villagers: while Buldeo tells his stories, 'the monkeys sat and talked in the 
upper branches' above him and his listeners (I: 76). But their status as almost-human 
is also in question: the monkeys are outcast, they are 'dirt', calling up notions of taboo 
and the abject.23 They are so disgusting because they are not human and not animal - 
they are what these categories define themselves against. The animals Mowgli defines 
himself with are powerful carnivores: wolves, bears, panthers, pythons.24 So while 
                                                           
23 For an interesting discussion of taboo and the abject in relation to The Water 
Babies, and the ideas of Kristeva and Mary Douglas, see Valentine Cunningham, 
'Soiled Fairy: The Water Babies in Its Time', Essays in Criticism, 35: 2 (April 1985): 
121-48. 
24 This identification also has masculine connotations. As Karen Davis argues, 
'Animals summoning forth images of things that are "natural, wild, and free" accord 
with the "masculine" spirit of adventure and conquest idolised by our culture' 
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the stories deal with the ambivalence of Mowgli's animal and human natures, the 
outcasting of the monkeys preserves a barrier across the obvious evolutionary  
connection between man and apes. The lawless, parodic behaviour of the monkeys, 
who steal animal speech and mimic human actions, is of course extremely 
carnivalesque. Their defeat and punishment places a limit on the free-play, the 
inversion of hierarchy, that is allowed in Kipling's use of the talking animal 
convention. On the other hand, because the monkeys are also used as a parody of 
certain human societies, like Mrs Gatty's rooks, the analogue between monkeys and 
men creeps back in.   
 These sorts of rich and complex ambiguities flourish especially in children's 
stories, where different forms of the talking animal genre exist together - parody, moral 
tale, nature study - and where messages of growing up and leaving the 'animal' behind 
clash with messages about the value of the child's primitivism and closeness to Nature. 
In these stories, scientific and evolutionary ideas about the relation of man and animals 
are presented, attacked, played with, parodied, without either the terrifying 
monstrosity of The Island of Dr Moreau, or the bland classicism of  'In the Rukh'. 
Writing for children provides a space of license and play, though, paradoxically, one 
which must also be watched over and controlled by the adult narrator, as the 
necessary transgressions of the talking animal convention, and the ambiguous 




                                                                                                                                                                         
('Thinking like a Chicken: Farm Animals and the Feminine Connection', in Adams and 
Donovan, p. 196). However, Kingsley has no problems in associating his male hero 
with weak and powerless water creatures. Perhaps Kipling is part of the forging of a a 
new, imperial masculinity.  
